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regarding the constitutionality of topless dancing. 111 As Justice
Lowe stated, "although plaintiff has squarely raised the
constitutional issue of whether the SLA's six foot rule violates
the freedom of expression of dancers employed by plaintiff, it is
unnecessary for this Court to reach the merits of this
constitutional claim," since the SLA's rule was declared null and
void for lack of authority to promulgate it.112 As such, the court
enjoined the SLA's enforcement of Rule 36.1(s).
People v. Tolia1 13
(decided September 14, 1995)

Defendant appealed from a judgment convicting him of inciting
to riot1 1 4 during a concert 1 15 being held in Thompkins Square
111. Jay-Jay Cabaret, 164 Misc. 2d at 680, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 942. The
court discussed in great detail that the instant case was very similar to Beer
Garden v. State Liquor Authority, 79 N.Y.2d 266, 590 N.E.2d 1193, 582
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1992), where the court struck down SLA Rule 36.1(q). Id. at
276, 590 N.E.2d at 1197, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 69. In striking down that rule, the
Beer Garden court found that "agencies are possessed of only those powers
expressly delegated by the Legislature, together with those powers required by
necessary implication." Id. Since the legislative history of subsections (q) and
(s) were the same, a determination that there was no authority to promulgate
subsection (q)
should also apply to subsection (s). Id. Hence the "six-foot" rule
should also be declared null and void. Jay-Jay Cabaret, 164 Misc. 2d at 680,
629 N.Y.S.2d at 942. The Jay-Jay Cabaret court took this approach in
resolving this case but noted that its declaration was "without prejudice to repromulgation of said rule upon a showing of the requisite grant of appropriate
statutory authority and compliance with the relevant statutory provision." Id.
112. Id.
113. 631 N.Y.S.2d 632 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1995).
114. See PENAL LAw § 240.08 (McKinney 1992). This section provides in
pertinent part: "A person is guilty of inciting to riot when he urges ten or more
persons to engage in tumultuous and violent conduct of a kind likely to create
public alarm. Inciting to riot is a class A misdemeanor." Id. The grand jury
charged defendant with riot in the first degree, which states:
A person is guilty of riot in the first degree when (a) simultaneously
with ten or more other persons he engages in tumultuous [sic] and
violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates
a grave risk of causing public alarm, and (b) in the course of and as a
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Park 1 16 (hereinafter the "Park") which erupted into a "violent
and tumultuous confrontation" between a crowd of over two
hundred persons and certain members of the New York City
Police Department. 117 Defendant argued, inter alia, 118 that his
conviction violated the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution 119 and article I, section 8 of the New York State
12 1
Constitution 120 because it abridged his freedom of speech.
Defendant further contended that while Penal Law section 240.08
includes no mens rea element, the First Amendment requires

proof of intent to incite violence and, therefore, his freedom of
speech may not be impinged upon unless the requisite intent was
established; 122 thus, making his "conviction against the weight of
result of such conduct, a person other than one of the participants
suffers physical injury or substantial property damage occurs. Riot in
the first degree is a class E felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.06 (McKinney 1992). The defendant was acquitted of
riot in the first degree after a jury trial. Tolia, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
115. The concert was a four-day event entitled the "Resist to Exist Concert"
and a "Squatters May Day" which began on April 28, 1990, and ran through
and included Tuesday, May 1, 1990. Id. at 632. The facts and circumstances
surrounding defendant's conviction centered around the events which occurred
on the last day of the concert, May 1, 1990. Id. at 632-35.
116. Thompkins Square Park is located in the lower east side of Manhattan
and extends from Seventh Street to Tenth Street between Avenues A and B. Id.
at 632. The layout of the park consists of a "band shell which is located on the
Seventh Street side of the Park facing north, in front of which is a concrete
area 50-70 feet wide containing semi-circular benches." Id.
117. Id.
118. Defendant also appeals his conviction on the grounds that the evidence
presented was legally insufficient and that the jury charge was improper "due
to the court's use of the words 'provoked' or 'stimulated' as a synonym for the
word 'urge', which improperly allowed the jury to find defendant guilty on a
theory of pure causation." Id. at 637.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." Id.
120. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. This section provides in pertinent part:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
121. Tolia, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 635-36.
122. Id.
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the evidence" and the statute constitutionally defective. 123 After a
jury trial, defendant was convicted of inciting to riot and was
sentenced to one-year in prison. 1 24 On appeal, the Appellate

Division, Third Department affirmed the conviction, finding that
such a conviction did not violate the defendant's free speech

rights. 125 In reaching this determination, the court found that the
defendant's "intentional actions posed a 'clear and present
danger' which led to violent, tumultuous behavior engaged in by

more than ten people[,]" rendering defendant's speech "not of the
variety protected by the United States and New York
Constitutions because such actions were "calculated to incite and

produce imminent lawless action."

126

Although initially the "Resist to Exist" concert in the Park was
being operated with all of the necessary and required permits

being in place,

127

certain events transpired on the last day of the

123. Id. at 635.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 636-37. In affirming defendant's conviction, the court also held
that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the conviction. Id. at 635.
In reaching this conclusion, the court viewed the evidence "in a light most
favorable to the People." See People v. Malizia, 62 N.Y.2d 755, 465 N.E.2d
364, 476 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1984) (finding sufficiency of the evidence in both
quantity and quality to support verdict), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984);
People v. Jemmott, 202 A.D.2d 366, 610 NY.S.2d 5 (1st Dep't 1994)
(finding the evidence sufficient as a matter of law to support the verdict by
giving the People the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence
presented). Furthermore, the court declined to review defendant's argument
concerning an improper jury charge in the interest of justice because it was
unpreserved on appeal as a matter of law. Tolia, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
Nevertheless, the court in Tolia hypothetically addressed defendant's argument
and found that the jury charge was proper because the trial "court's definition
of the word 'urge' properly conveyed its correct meaning to the jury; that to
find the defendant guilty of the crime charged, the People had to prove his
intent to create violence; and that there was a clear and present danger his
actions would do so." Id. at 637.
126. Id. at 636-37.
127. Id. at 632. The requisite permits were obtained by the concert
organizers, Lori Sbordone and Mary Shero, from the New York City Parks
and Police Departments. Id. Among other things, the permits specified that the
use of amplifiers was to cease at 7:00 p.m. Id. However, on the final day of
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concert which resulted in the arrest, charge and conviction of the
defendant herein. 128 On May 1, 1990, the final day of the
concert, there were several police officers 129 and Parks
Department Enforcement Officers 130 patrolling and monitoring
the concert.1 31 Initially, the size of the crowd in the Park ranged
between fifty to one hundred people, all of whom were generally
"well-behaved, drinking and enjoying the music." 132 However,
certain statements were made intermittently during the concert by
various individuals, including defendant, to the effect that the
Park belonged to the concert-goers and that the police officers
and park enforcement personnel had no right to interfere with
their festivities. 133
By 6:00 p.m. the audience had increased to approximately two
hundred people, some of whom were led on a march through
Greenwich Village only to arrive back in the Park approximately
one hour later. 134 At this time, after being informed that the
permit for the concert concerning amplifier use could not be
extended to 10:00 p.m., the defendant took to the stage and
addressed the crowd with statements such as "'Be prepared to
break the law tonight', 'Be prepared to resist tonight' and 'Be
prepared to fight tonight.'" 135 These statements did not seem to
have an immediate reaction on the crowd, however, the police
the concert, an extension of time was granted for the use of amplifiers until
9:00 p.m. Id.
128. Id.
129. The New York City Police Officer in charge of the event was
Inspector Michael Julian, Commander of the Ninth Precinct who, along with
Sergeant Steven Marron and five other uniformed officers, monitored the Park
form 3:00 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. when additional officers arrived on the scene.
Id. at 632-33.
130. Only two uniformed Parks Department Officers were on hand at the
Park, however, they were easily identifiable in their green khaki uniforms. Id.
at 633.
131. Id. at 632-33.
132. Id. at 633.
133. Id.
134. Id. The marchers carried banners which read such things as "'May
Day', 'Squat or Rot' and 'F**k the Police'" and were followed by Sergeant
Marron and other Officers. Id.
135. Id.
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officers were "sufficiently alarmed ... to promptly call for
136
additional officers."
The additional seven to ten officers 137 who arrived at the Park
at approximately 8:30 p.m., were instructed to "deploy[]
themselves along the fringe of the crowd" which was estimated to
be "between 200 and 300 people present in front of the bandshell
and between 30 and 60 people on stage." 13 8 Among those
individuals on stage was the defendant who, at some point
between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., interrupted the music with various
speeches all of which asserted that the crowd should resist the
139
police in turning off the electricity.
At 9:00 p.m. the band on stage began a new song at which
point certain officers approached the stage to inquire as to how
long the music was going to last. The individuals on stage
thought the officers intended to stop the concert.140 Thus, as the
officers approached the stairs leading to the stage, the defendant
allegedly pointed at the officers and yelled into the microphone
"The pigs are here to shut off the power and if you want the
party to continue, you better let them know it" and "They are
going to try to shut us down. What are we going to do? We are
going to resist. '' 141 Thereafter, defendant further proclaimed,
"'Resist' and began chanting 'Whose f***g park? Our f***g
park.' 142 It was unclear whether or not defendant proclaimed

136. Id.

137. The additional officers were "plainclothes and anti-crime officers...
including Captain Sullivan, Sergeants Bourken and Rittenhouse and other
officers." Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. Defendant's speeches are alleged to consist of the following:
"'This is the people's Park'; 'Resist, the police are coming. Resist';

'Resist, the police are coming.'; 'The police are here to shut the power
off at 9:00, we can't let them do that.' or 'The police are here to shut
the power down and we have to resist the police.'"
Id.
140. Id. One individual announced to the crowd, "Here they come, here
comes the park pigs, here comes the police." Id.

141. Id.
142. Id.
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"[w]e are going to riot." 143 However, it was established that
defendant "raised his arms over his head, waiving the crowd
toward the stage and encouraging people to come forward." 144
Subsequently, several officers 145 attempted to get on stage to
stop the concert but were prevented from doing so by the crowd
on stage blocking them. 14 6 One police officer, who was able to
get on stage, informed defendant that the concert would come to
an end after the band finished performing as the electricity was
going to be turned off. 147 After hearing this, defendant again
began waving and encouraging the crowd. 14 8 In response to
defendant's urging, approximately one hundred people "surged
forward from the audience while defendant and others already on
stage rushed toward the officers, grabbing, pushing and swinging
at them." 149 After ordering defendant's arrest, several bottles

were thrown at the police officers and the defendant began to
fight with certain police officers and resist arrest. 150 However,
while the defendant was being handcuffed, the arresting officer
was attacked by another member of the audience. 15 1 In addition,
several of the other officers were involved in their own
"struggles with various members of the concert-goers."152
Several more officers arrived on the scene at approximately 9:15
153
p.m. in an attempt at securing and monitoring the crowd.
However, it was not until 10:30 p.m. that the crowd finally
143. Id.
144. Id. at 634.
145. Among those officers attempting to get on stage were Parks
Department Enforcement Officers Jordan and King as well as Sergeant
Marron. Id.
146. Id. The "people massing at the top of the stairs" used body blocks to
stop the officers from getting on stage. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Several officers were hospitalized after receiving concussions and
lacerations from being beaten by members of the audience and from being
struck by bottles. Id.
153. Id.
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dissipated, but not before "other officers and participants were
154
injured and more arrests were made."
In appealing his conviction, defendant raised a constitutional
claim concerning violation of his freedom of speech rights along
with an allegation that the statute under which he was being
convicted was statutorily defective and therefore, constitutionally
invalid. 155 Defendant asserted that "although the statute
include[d] no mens rea element, the First Amendment requires
proof that he intended to incite violence, and that his conviction
thereby violated the First and Fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article 1 [section 8] of the New
York Constitution." 156 Thus, defendant put into question the
constitutional validity of the statute, arguing that it impinged
upon his fundamental right of freedom of speech.
In affirming defendants conviction, the First Department found
that "under the facts presented herein, defendant's speech [was]
not of the variety protected by the United States and New York
Constitutions but was calculated to incite and produce imminent
lawless action." ' 157 In reaching this determination, the court
relied predominately upon several United States Supreme Court
cases 15 8 and only two New York cases, 159 all of which
concerned the constitutionality of abridging speech in certain
instances where such regulation is for the welfare of the
public. 160

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at 635-36.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 636-37.
Id. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Hess v.

Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969);
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
159. Tolia, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37. See, e.g., Lewis v. AFTRA, 34
N.Y.2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 735, 357 N.Y.S.2d 419, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093
(1974); People v. Winston, 64 Misc. 2d 150, 314 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1970).

160. See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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For instance, in Dennis v. United States,16 1 the Supreme Court
upheld sections two and three of the Smith Act, 162 finding that
such an Act which has the "obvious purpose... to protect
existing Government, not from change by peaceable, lawful and
constitutional means, but from change by violence, revolution
and terrorism" 163 must be constitutional. 164 Furthermore, the
Court found that "[o]verthrow of the Government by force and
violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the
Government to limit speech." 165 Thus, the Court held that the

statute did not "inherently, or as construed or applied in the
instant case, violate the First Amendment .

"..."166
Therefore,

petitioners conviction under the Act was "proper1- and
constitutionall-," in light of the fact that their "conspiracy to
organize the communist party and to teach and advocate the
overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and
violence created a 'clear and present danger' of an attempt to
overthrow the Government by force and violence." 167
161. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
162. Id. The Smith Act made it a crime to willfully and knowingly conspire
to organize a group of persons (the Communist Party) to teach and advocate
the overthrow and destruction of the government of the United States by force
and violence and to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing
and destroying the government of the United States by force and violence. Id.
at 497.
163. Id. at 501.
164. Id. at 499.
165. Id. at 509.
166. Id. at 516-17.
167. Id. Moreover, the Court recognized the role of the judiciary when
deciding whether a statute violates an individual's freedom of speech rights and
further held that:
When facts are found that establish the violations of a statute, the
protection against conviction afforded by the First Amendment is a
matter of law. The doctrine that there must be a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent is a
judicial rule to be applied as a matter of law by the courts. The guilt is
established by proof of facts. Whether the First Amendment protects the
activity which constitutes the violation of the statute must depend upon a
judicial determination of the scope of the First Amendment applied to
the circumstance of the case.
Id. at 513.
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In contrast, the Supreme Court in Noto v. United States, 16 8

although faced with the same issue of whether a conviction under
the Smith Act was constitutional, reversed defendant's
conviction, holding that it was violative of his constitutional
freedom of speech right in light of the vastly different
circumstances surrounding such conviction. 169 Much of the
evidence deduced at trial showed the Communist Party's teaching
of certain abstract doctrines of "propriety or even moral necessity
for a resort to force and violence," without any "substantial
direct or circumstantial evidence" of advocating to actively resort
to violence imminently. 170 Furthermore, the Court found that
"[tlo permit an inference of present advocacy from evidence
showing at best only a purpose or conspiracy to advocate in the
future would be to allow the jury to blur the lines of distinction
17 1
between the various offenses punishable under the Smith Act."
Therefore, the Court found that defendant's conviction was
against the weight of the evidence and reversed the judgment
because it violated defendant's rights under the First
172
Amendment.
In Tolia, the First Department, in upholding defendant's
conviction, applied the 'clear and present danger' standard as set
forth in Schenck v. United States173 and its progeny. 174 In his
168. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
169. Id. at 291. The Court held that "the record in this case ... bears
much infirmity and requires us to conclude that the evidence of illegal Party
advocacy was insufficient to support this conviction." Id. Specifically, the
Court found insufficient evidence "to prove that the Communist Party
presently advocated forcible overthrow of the Government, not as an abstract
doctrine but by the use of language reasonably and ordinarily calculated to
incite persons to action, immediately or in the future." Id. at 290.
170. Id. at 298.
171. Id. at 298-99.
172. Id. at 300.
173. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). This case involved convictions under the Criminal
Espionage Act, arising out of certain acts by the defendants which "caus[ed]
and attempt[ed] to cause insubordination ... in the military and naval forces
of the United States, when the U.S. was at war with [Germany], to wit, that
the defendants willfully conspired to have printed and circulated to men who
had been called and accepted for military service," certain documentation
which proscribed, among other things, abandonment of the war and draft. Id.
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majority opinion in Schenck, Justice Holmes enunciated the 'clear
and present danger' standard by stating that "the question in

every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." 175 The Court further stated that
to find such a clear and present danger under certain
76
circumstances "is a question of proximity and degree."1
Furthermore, the Supreme Court expanded upon the standard

177
set forth in Schenck in its holding in Herndon v. Lowry,

wherein the Court held that:
at 48-49. In upholding defendants' convictions, the Court found that the
documents in question "would not have been sent unless [they] had been
intended to have some effect," and further, the Court "did not see what effect
[the documents] could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft
except to influence them to obstruct the carrying out of it." Id. at 51.
Therefore, in light of the circumstances under which the defendants uttered
their speech, their convictions were not in violation of the First Amendment.
Id. at 52.
174. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Hess v. Indiana,
414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
175. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 49, 52 (1919).
176. Id. For example, "[w]hen a nation is at war, many things that might be
said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will
not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any Constitutional right." Id.
177. 301 U.S. 242 (1937). The Supreme Court struck down defendant's
conviction under section 56 of the Georgia Penal Code for attempting to incite
insurrection by organizing the Communist Party, since the construction and
application of the statute deprived defendant of the right of freedom of speech
and of assembly. Id. at 258. The Court set forth the relevant provisions of
section 56 which stated that "[a]ny attempt, by persuasion or otherwise, to
induce others to join in any combined resistance to the lawful authority of the
State shall constitute an attempt to incite insurrection." Id. at 246 n.56.
Furthermore, the Court stated:
The statute, as construed and applied, amounts merely to a dragnet
which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a change of government if a
jury can be persuaded that he ought to have foreseen his words would
have some effect in the future conduct of others. No reasonably
ascertainable standard of guilt is prescribed. So vague and indeterminate
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The power of the State to abridge freedom of speech and of
assembly is the exception rather than the rule and the penalizing
even of utterances of a defined character must find its
justification in a reasonable apprehension of danger to organized
government. The judgment of the legislature is not unfettered.
The limitation upon individual liberty must have appropriate
relation to the safety of the state. Legislation which goes beyond
17 8
this need violates the principles of the Constitution.

This individual liberty of freedom of speech and of assembly is
"[t]he right of a man to think what he pleases, to write what he
thinks, and to have his thoughts made available for others to hear
or read has an engaging ring of universality." 179 Therefore,
"statutes affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on
freedom of speech, must observe the established distinctions
between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless

action ...."180
are the boundaries thus set to the freedom of speech and assembly that
the law necessarily violates the guarantees of liberty embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 263.
178. Id.
179. Dennis v. United States, 241 U.S. 494, 520-21 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). However, Justice Frankfurter was careful to point out that the
liberty guaranteed under the First Amendment was not without limits. His
concurrence goes on to state that "the soil in which the Bill of Rights grew was
not a soil of arid pedantry. The historic antecedents of the First Amendment
preclude the notion that its purpose was to give unqualified immunity to every
expression that touched on matters within the range of political interest." Id. at
521 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But compare Lewis v. AFTRA, 34 N.Y.2d
265, 277, 313 N.E.2d 735, 743, 357 N.Y.S.2d 419, 431 (1974) (holding that
"[fireedom of speech and freedom of the press are fundamental rights" and the
denial of such rights "violates basic principles of liberty and justice and is not
to be tolerated in a free society").
180. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 n.4 (1969). Compare Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding defendant's conviction for
burning the American flag, under a Texas venerated object desecration statute,
unconstitutional because defendant's conduct amounted to political expression
and was speech of the sort protected by the First Amendment); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-08 (1973) (finding defendant's conviction under an
Indiana disorderly conduct statute unconstitutional because the statute, as
applied to defendant, merely punished his spoken words which did not amount
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Moreover, the Court in Brandenburgv. Ohio, 18 1 reiterated and
expanded upon this 'clear and present danger' standard. The
Court struck down defendant's conviction under the Ohio
Criminal Syndicalism statute for "advocat[ing]... the duty,
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform" and for "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any
society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or
advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism" as
unconstitutional. 18 2 The Court recognized that where a statute
does not draw a distinction between the mere abstract teaching of
resorting to violence and "'preparing a group for violent action
and steeling [the group] to such action,' [such a statute]
impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments." 183 Thus, only where such
advocacy by an individual is "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action" will the individual's freedom of speech or assembly be
abridged.184
The Tolia court determined that Tolia engaged in conduct and
speech which by its very nature posed a "'clear and present
danger' which led to violent, tumultuous behavior engaged in by
more then [sic] ten people." 185 Furthermore, the court found that
defendant's actions were intentional in light of the circumstances
which were "steadily deteriorating" and were "worsened by
defendant's relentless calls for the crowd to use force to resist
and stop the police from ending the concert, which police officers
to fighting words nor were they "intended to incite further lawless action on
the part of the crowd in [his] vicinity [or] likely to produce such action").
181. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
182. Id. at 444-45 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 448 (citations omitted).

184. Id. at 447. The Brandenburg Court, finding the Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism statute unconstitutional, recognized that "[n]either the indictment
nor the trial judge's instruction to the jury in any way refined the statute's bald
definition of the crime in terms of mere advocacy not distinguished from
incitement to imminent lawless action." Id. at 448-49.
185. Tolia, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
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were greatly outnumbered." 186 The court noted that the
defendant should have been able to ascertain the volatile mood of
the crowd as evidenced by the numerous bottles being thrown
and shattering in defendant's vicinity, the "grabbing, pushing and
swinging at the police officers," and the surging forward of the
crowd in response to defendant's urging.187 Moreover, the riot
began seconds after defendant's urging of the agitated crowd to
come forward. 188 Indeed, the purpose behind Penal Law section
240.08189 is "to prevent the outbreak of violence by discouraging
such language and conduct as can be reasonably anticipated
would cause civil disorder" thereby, "penalizing those who urge
riotous conduct without the necessity of proving a consummated
riot or an agreement to riot by persons assembled with [an]
accused." 190 Thus, under the circumstances, Tolia's actions were
not protected under either the Federal or New York State
Constitutions, as such action was intended to produce imminent
lawless action and there was a "clear and present danger
[defendant's] actions would do so."191
Finally, defendant asserted that the statute under which he was
convicted is constitutionally defective because it fails to enunciate
the elements of "intent" and "clear and present danger.' 192
However, the court held that "the fact that the statute makes no
reference to 'intent' or to 'clear and present danger' does not
deem it unconstitutional," since a "strong presumption of
constitutionality attaches to state statutes and ...

whenever

possible, the courts must construe a statute in a manner which
avoids constitutional defects." ' 193 The court looked at People v.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.

189. See supra note 114.
190. People v. Winston, 64 Misc. 2d 150, 152-54, 314 N.Y.S.2d 480, 49394 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1970).
191. Tolia, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37.
192. Id.at 636.

193. Id. See Winston, 64 Misc. 2d at 156, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 497 (upholding
section 240.08 of the New York Penal Law as constitutional despite the
absence of the elements of "intent" and "clear and present danger"). See also
People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 171-72, 474 N.E.2d 567, 578, 485
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Winston, 194 where the Monroe County Supreme Court grappled
with the constitutionality of this statute and held that "[w]hile
mindful of the necessity of these two elements before one's
freedom of speech may be abridged, it is sufficient that this Court
interpret the statute as requiring those elements in accordance
with sound constitutional principles so as to preserve its
constitutionality." 195 Further, the court in Tolia recognized that
"the societal value of speech must, on occasion, be subordinated
to other values and considerations." 196
Thus, the court upheld the constitutionality of Penal Law
section 240.08 of the State of New York both in its construction
and as it was applied to the defendant under both the Federal and
New York State Constitutions thereby, finding that defendant's
freedom of speech rights were not violated.197 Therefore,
according to the Tolia court, the New York State Constitution
goes no further than the Federal Constitution in protecting speech
that incites imminent lawless action.

N.Y.S.2d 207, 218 (1984) (holding that a rape statute which is underinclusive
because it exempts women is not necessarily unconstitutional but rather "the
legislature would prefer to eliminate the exemptions and thereby preserve the
statute" and that to declare such a statute a "nullity would have a disastrous
effect on the public interest and safety"); Epton v. New York, 19 N.Y.2d 496,
505, 227 N.E.2d 829, 834, 281 N.Y.S.2d 9, 16 (1967) (finding a criminal
anarchy statute constitutional by "construing it in accordance with sound
constitutional principles so as to preserve its constitutionality"), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 29 (1968); Simpson v. Wells, 181 N.Y. 252, 257, 73 N.E. 1025,
1026 (1905) (upholding a tax assessment statute which was open to two
constructions as constitutional because "by any reasonable construction it can
be given a meaning in harmony with fundamental law").
194. 64 Misc. 2d 150, 314 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1970).
195. Id. at 156, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97.
196. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 503.
197. Tolia, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
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